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Hamish Stewart*

Parents, Children, and the Law of
Assault

The debate concerning the constitutionality and the possible repeal of s. 43 of
the Criminal Code, the so-called "spanking" provision, has raised an important
issue: when a parent touches a child without the child's consent, under what
conditions is the parent's conduct an assault? Supporters of the'repeal of s. 43
have suggested that parents are protected from inappropriate prosecutions by
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and by the common law defences of de
minimis non curat lex and necessity But prosecutorial discretion is not a suitable
substitute for a proper definition of the scope of criminal liability, and the defences
of de minimis and necessity do not cover many typical situations in which parents
apply non-consensual force to children for proper purposes. Further development
of the common law defence of "deemed consent" would be more promising. This
defence is available as a defence when a parent, a teacher, or another caregiver
uses proportionate force in touching a child for a proper purpose. Because of
certain problems in the common law definition and application of this defence,
Parliament should enact a defence of "parental care," clearly restating the legal
standard governing the touching of a child for a proper purpose.

Le d6bat sur la constitutionnalit6 et I'abrogation possible de I'article43 du Code
criminel, disposition que certains appellent - article sur la fess6e " souleve une
importante question : quand un parent touche un enfant sans le consentement de
ce dernier, dans quelles conditions la conduite duparent constitue-t-elle des voies
de fait? Les partisans de I'abrogationde I'article 43 avancent que les parents sont
prot6g6s contre des poursuites injustifi~es par I'exercice du pouvoir discretionnaire
de poursuivre ainsi que par les moyens de d~fense de minimis non curat lex (1a
loi ne se soucie pas des petites choses) et de n6cessit6 de la common law Par
contre, le pouvoir discr6tionnaire de poursuivre n'est pas un substitut acceptable
6 la d~finition ad6quate de la port~e de la responsabilite criminelle, et les moyens
de d~fense de minimis et de n6cessit6 ne sauraient s'appliquer , beaucoup de
situations usuelles oL les parents appliquent une force non consensuelle 6 leurs
enfants a des fins ad6quates. Approfondir la d6fense de common law invoquant
la presomption de consentement serait une avenue plus prometteuse. Ce moyen
de d~fense peut 6tre invoqud lorsqu'un parent, un enseignant ou toute autre
personne responsable utilise une force ad6quate pour toucher un enfant J une fin
I6gitime. Parceque la d6finition de ce moyen de defense dans la common law et
son application pr6sentent certains probl~mes, le Parlement devrait adopter une
defense d'- assistance parentale -, 6nongant clairement la norme I6gale qui r~git
le fait de toucher un enfant b une fin Idgitime.
*
Hamish Stewart, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 78 Queen's Park,
Toronto, ON M5S 2C5, hamish.stewart@utoronto.ca, January 2009. A previous version of this paper
was prepared for the Children's Law and Family Violence Policy Unit, Department of Justice, Canada.
The views expressed in both versions of the paper are my own and should not be attributed to the
Department of Justice. I am very grateful to Lisa Micucci for her comments on the previous version,
to an anonymous reader for comments on a subsequent version, to my colleagues Arthur Ripstein and
Martha Shaffer for conversations about the subject matter of this paper, and to Don Stuart for a helpful
exchange of views about s. 43 of the CriminalCode.
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Introduction
When a parent touches a child without the child's consent, under what
conditions is the parent's conduct a criminal offence? This question
may seem to be of purely theoretical interest at best: it is 6sually easy to
recognize the difference between the kind of routine physical contact that
is necessary to care for children, which is evidently not criminal, and the
physical or sexual abuse of children, which is a very serious offence indeed.
But under Canadian law as it now stands, the answer to the question is far
from obvious. There are at least two reasons for this state of affairs. First,
the offence of assault in Canada is defined very broadly; though the scope
of the law is not entirely certain, it is quite arguable that any intentional
and non-consensual touching, even if fleeting and entirely harmless, is an
assault as defined by s. 265 of the Criminal Code. Second, there is very
little case law which might provide guidance on this question; because it
is usually easy to recognize the difference between routine care-giving and
assault or abuse, there are, except in the context of corporal punishment,
very few cases that consider the boundary between them.
But the question of the legal status of the non-consensual touching of a
child is notjust of theoretical interest. It is central to the debate surrounding
the proposed repeal of s. 43 of the CriminalCode, the so-called "spanking"
provision that permits teachers, parents, and persons standing in the place
of parents to use reasonable force "by way of correction toward a pupil
or child, as the case may be, who is under [their] care, if the force was
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reasonable under the circumstances." 1 In that context, the question was
considered not only by the Supreme Court of Canada in its well-known
decision upholding s. 43,2 but also by members of the Senate in its debates
over a bill that would have repealed s. 43. The senators recognized that if
s. 43 were repealed, it would be arguable that not just corporal punishment
but any non-consensual touching of a child by a parent or teacher would be
a criminal offence. No-one thought that would be a desirable outcome, and
the bill that ultimately passed the Senate would therefore have replaced s.
43 with a tightly defined defence of "parental control. ' '3 But s. 43 speaks
only to a very specific purpose for use of force against a child; it does not
deal with the myriad circumstances in which parents, teachers, and other
caregivers may touch children without their consent for purposes other
than correction. So the question posed in this paper remains important
whether or not s. 43 is ever repealed.
But the debate around s. 43 is highly relevant to the question because
the position taken by many participants in that debate implied that the
question need not be answered. Some commentators and senators argued
that the repeal of s. 43 would be unproblematic, for several reasons. Some
pointed to the existence of prosecutorial discretion; it was said that the
police would not Jay, and the Crown would not prosecute, a charge in
the vast majority of uses of force against a child. Others pointed to the
common law defences of necessity and de minimis non curatlex (the law
does not care about trifles). It was said that if a parent or teacher were
inappropriately charged, he or she would be able to defend himself or
herself on the ground that the touching was either necessary or so trifling
that it should be beneath the law's notice. 4 Implicit in this position is the
view that the interesting question is not whether non-consensual touching
of a child is a criminal offence but whether a parent or teacher will ever be
unjustly convicted in such a case; and the answer to that question is, given
our existing laws and institutional practices, a clear "no."
This position, though plausible at first sight, does not stand up to
sustained scrutiny. There is little doubt that a parent, teacher, or other
1. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.43.
2.
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1
S.C.R. 76 [Canadian Foundation].
3.
Bill S-209, which would have repealed and replaced s. 43, passed the Senate on 17 June 2008
and, if not for the dissolution of Parliament in the fall of 2008, would have been debated in the House
of Commons.
4.
For some of these themes, see Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 5th ed.
(Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 2007) at 530 [Stuart]; Canadian Foundation, supra note 2 at paras.
196-208 per Arbour J. dissenting; Debates of the Senate, No. 144 (14 November 2007) at 214 (Hon.
C61ine Hervieux-Payette).
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caregiver should be permitted to touch a child, with or without the child's
consent, for what I will call a proper purpose; that is, for purposes related
to the discharge of that adult's duties in respect of the child. These purposes
would include caring for the child, protecting the child, and preventing the
child from misbehaving. Neither the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
nor the common law defences of necessity and de minimis would be
adequate to protect parents who were carrying out their duties. In Part 11. 1
below, I argue that prosecutorial discretion, though central to the effective
functioning of the criminal justice system, is not a suitable substitute for a
criminal law that properly defines the scope of criminal liability. And, as I
show in Parts II.3.a and II.3.b below, the common law defences of necessity
and de minimis are also inadequate. The common law defence of necessity
would be available to a parent or teacher in only a very small number of
the cases where the touching is for a proper purpose. As for the maxim
de minimis non curat lex, it is not clear whether there is such a common
law defence in Canadian criminal law; if there is, it is not clear whether
it applies to the offence of assault; and if it does, it would be available in
only a very small number of the cases where a parent or teacher touches a
child for a proper purpose. Moreover, in addition to these considerations,
the requirement of the rule of law suggests that the criminal liability of
a parent who touches a child for a proper purpose should not depend on
the vagaries of prosecutorial discretion or on criminal law excuses. It
may be unlikely that a parent is inappropriately charged, but if such a
charge were laid, the parent should be able to rely on a legal regime that
properly defines his or her right to touch a child for a proper purpose.
The common law is not entirely without resources to protect the
parent, teacher, or other caregiver who properly applies force to a child.
The common law defence of "deemed consent," which has received little
attention in the debate around s. 43, is available as a defence when a
parent, a teacher, or another caregiver uses proportionate force in touching
a child for a proper purpose. But because of certain problems with the
defence of deemed consent, it would be helpful to accompany any repeal
of s. 43 with a statutory defence that restated the common law defence of
deemed consent. In Part II.3.c below, I discuss the common law defence
and consider the versions of this defence, under the name "parental
control," that have been recently enacted in New Zealand and proposed
by the Senate of Canada. I argue that these restatements attempt to draw
the boundaries of permissible uses of force too narrowly. I propose that
parents, teachers, caregivers, and children themselves would be better
served by a clear statutory restatement of the legal standard governing the
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touching of a child for a proper purpose, under the rubric of a defence of
''parental care."
I.

The law of assault: an overview

1. The definition of assault
Section 265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code defines the offence of assault in
very broad terms:
without the consent of another
A person commits an assault when ...
person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or
indirectly ...
It is well-established in the case law interpreting s. 265 that the elements
of this offence (that is, those facts that the Crown must prove beyond a
5
reasonable doubt to get a conviction) are as follows:
*

the accused touched the complainant;

" the touching was intentional (i.e., not negligent, accidental,
inadvertent);
*

the complainant did not consent;

*

and the accused was aware of, reckless as to, or wilfully blind to the
complainant's lack of consent.

If all of these elements are proved, the accused is guilty of the basic
offence of assault, which is sometimes referred to as common assault,
simple assault, or assault simpliciter.6
Two elements of simple assault are particularly important here:
the element of touching and the element of non-consent. It is the broad
definition of these two elements that creates the problem addressed in this
paper.
2. The element of touching
The word "assault" and the phrase "application of force" may suggest that
the Crown needs to prove some degree of violence or hostility on the part
of the accused, or some degree of injury or alarm to the complainant. But

5.
R. v. Palombi, 2007 ONCA 486, 222 C.C.C. (3d) 528 sub nom. R. v. P(K.), at paras. 28, 34,
35 [Palombi]; Alan W. Mewett & Morris Manning, Mewett and Manning on Criminal Law, 3d ed.
(Markham: Butterworths, 1994) at 749-55 [Mewett & Manning]; Hamish Stewart, "When Does Fraud
Vitiate Consent? A Comment on R. v. Williams" (2004) 49 C.L.Q. 144 at 145.
6.
Criminal Code, supra note 1 at s. 265(l)(b)-(c) defines two other kinds of assault, ss. 267-268
define various aggravated forms of assault, and ss. 271-273.2 define several forms of sexual assault.
For the purposes of this paper, it will be not be necessary to discuss these other forms of assault.
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it is well-established that a simple assault can be committed without any
particular degree of violence, much less anyinjury, to the complainant,
and without any motive of hostility on the part of the accused. So it is often
said that any non-consensual touching, no matter how minor, satisfies the
touching element of the offence of assault.7 For this reason, throughout
this paper, I use the word "touching" and the phrase "application of force"
to mean exactly the same thing: the degree of physical interaction that
would satisfy the statutory requirement that the accused "applies force
... directly or indirectly" under s. 265(1)(a), regardless of the accused's
motivation for the touching and regardless of the degree of harm, if any,
caused by the touching. This interpretation of the touching element of
assault has important implications for the possible application of the de
minimis maxim, as discussed further below.
3. The element of non-consent
To prove assault, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the complainant did not consent to the touching. Consent to
intentional touching (intentional application of force) can be either actual
or implied. The complainant actually consents if he or she is willing to
be touched. So, to establish actual non-consent, the Crown has to prove
that the complainant was not willing to be touched. Because the element
of actual non-consent is rarely in issue in cases of simple assault, it is not
entirely clear from the case law whether a willingness to be touched is
determined with reference to the complainant's subjective state of mind,
or whether it is better understood as the complainant's manifestation, by
words or gesture, of a willingness to be touched. For the purposes of this
paper, I will assume that the concept of actual consent in simple assault,
as in sexual assault, depends on the complainant's state of mind: his or her
subjective willingness to be touched.8 So to prove actual non-consent, the
Crown must prove that the complainant was subjectively unwilling to be
touched.
Implied (or deemed) consent, in contrast to actual consent, is a consent
that is deemed to have been given to a particular application of force that

The most recent authority on point is Palombi, supra note 5 at para. 28. See also R. v. Burden
7.
(1981), 64 C.C.C. (2d) 68 (B.C.C.A.) (a case of indecent assault); R. v. Bernier(1997), 119 C.C.C. (3d)
467 (Que.C.A.) at 475-6, aff'd [1998] 1 S.C.R. 975 (a case of sexual assault); Mewett & Manning,
supra note 5 at 757.
There is extensive statutory and case law on the meaning of consent and non-consent in the
8.
law of sexual assault. See in particular ss. 273.1 and 273.2 of the Criminal Code, as interpreted in
R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 [Ewanchuk]; see also the discussion in Hamish Stewart, Sexual
Offences in CanadianLaw, looseleaf (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2004) at §3:300 [Stewart]. But the
law on the meaning of actual consent in cases of non-sexual assault is much less developed.
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occurs in the course of an activity that the complainant has agreed to
participate in. 9 The leading Canadian cases on implied consent involve
hockey games. A hockey player does not actually (i.e., subjectively)
consent to each specific physical contact with members of the other team.
Quite the contrary: he or she subjectively does not want to be checked,
hooked, or tripped precisely because these actions impede his or her
effectiveness as a member of the team. But by willingly participating in
the game itself, each player has agreed to accept the physical contacts that
typically occur in the course of a hockey game, and therefore is deemed
to consent to those contacts. The agreement to participate gives rise to
the player's implied consent to those physical contacts, whether or not he
subjectively agrees to any one of them in particular. In Cey, the leading
case on point, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated that "in agreeing
to play the game a hockey player consents to some forms of intentional
bodily contact and to the risk of injury therefrom [including those] forms
sanctioned by the rules [and those] forms, denounced by the rules but
falling within the accepted standards by which the game is played."'"
Moreover; there are many activities besides hockey that occur with the
deemed consent of the participants. L'Heureux-Dubd J. has recognized, in
obiter dicta, that there may be implied consent to a degree of touching on
social occasions and in "many aspects of day to day life."" L'HeureuxDub6 J.'s point might be illustrated by the social conventions applicable to
social gatherings (shaking hands, patting someone on the back or arm) or
by the inevitable pushing, bumping, and jostling that occurs on a crowded
bus or subway car. In each case, the participants may not actually consent
to each physical contact, but they are deemed to consent to it by their
participation in the activity in question.
To negate implied or deemed consent, the Crown has to show that the
touching in question was not within the norms of the activity in question.
For example, to prove that a hockey player had assaulted another player
during a game, the Crown has to show that the degree of violence the
player used was outside the norms applicable to hockey 2; to prove that
a person's conduct on a social occasion was an assault, the Crown would
9.
This is another issue on which there is an important difference between simple assault and sexual
assault. The defence of implied consent is undoubtedly available on a charge of simple assault, but
the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that there is no defence of implied consent to a charge of
sexual assault: Ewanchuk, supra note 8 at para. 31.
10. R. v. Cey (1989),48 C.CC. (3d) 480 at 488 (Sask.C.A.); see also R. v. Leclerc (1991), 67 C.CC.
(3d) 563 at 568-72 (Ont.C.A.).
l1. R. v. Cuerrier,[1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 at para. 21 [Cuerrier].
12. See e.g. R. v. Watson (1975), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 150 (Ont.Prov.Ct.); R. v. Ciccarelli (1989), 54
C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Ont.Dist.Ct.).
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have to show that the conduct was outside the norms applicable to that
type of social occasion. 3
The Crown will also be able to prove an assault even where the
complainant consented (or where the Crown cannot disprove consent)
where the law, for policy reasons, does not recognize the complainant's
consent as a defence. The Supreme Court recognized this possibility in
Jobidon,14 holding that the accused had committed an assault when he
caused and intended to cause serious bodily harm in the course of a
consensual fist fight. 5 More generally, Jobidon should be understood as
refusing to recognize consent to bodily harm that is intentionally inflected
in the context of a socially valueless activity. 6 In a sense, the Jobidon
doctrine is the mirror image of the doctrine of deemed consent: in the
former, an actual consent is disregarded because of the social uselessness
and harmfulness of the activity in which it occurs, while in the latter,
an actual non-consent to a particular application of force is disregarded
because of the complainant's willing participation in an activity that is
socially valued.
4. Defences to assault
In this paper I use the word "defence" in its broad sense to refer to any
set of facts that will result in an acquittal. Defences in this sense include
facts that negate an element of the offence (e.g., the Crown's failure to
prove the fault element), facts that justify conduct that would otherwise be
criminal (e.g., self-defence), and facts that excuse criminal conduct (e.g.,
duress).' 7 So if the Crown cannot prove one of the elements of assault,
then the accused has a defence in this broad sense; for example, if the
Crown fails to prove the element of non-consent, the accused is entitled
to the benefit of the "defence" of consent. But the offence of assault, like
all other offences in the Criminal Code, is also subject to the defences of
general application, that is, those offences that are available even where

13. See e.g. R. v. Bennett, [2006] N.J. No. 244 at para. 47 (Prov.Ct.).
14. R. v. Jobidon (1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 454 (S.C.C.) [Jobidon].
15. The accused was charged with unlawful act manslaughter. The victim had died from the injuries
he suffered during the consensual fistfight. The theory of the defence, accepted by the trial judge,
was that because of the victim's consent, the accused had committed no unlawful act and was thus
not criminally responsible for the death. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada both
held that the victim's consent to the fistfight would not be recognized by the law of assault; thus, the
accused had assaulted the victim and was guilty as charged.
16. This interpretation is based on the reasons offered by the majority for refusing to recognize
the consent in Jobidon itself, supra note 14 at 491-5. For further discussion of the interpretation and
application of Jobidon, see Stewart, supra note 8 at 3:300.40.
17. Compare the discussion of excuses and justifications in R. v. Perka, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232
[Perka].
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the Crown has proved all the elements of the offence: self-defence, duress,
necessity, and so forth.
If the word "defence" is used in this broad sense, the question posed
at the outset of the paper can be restated as follows: what defences, if any,
are available to a parent, teacher, or other caregiver who touches a child,
without the child's consent, and under what circumstances? This question
is addressed in the next part of the paper.
II. Applications offorce to children
1. Some hypothetical cases
It is difficult to find reported cases of non-sexual assaults on children that
test the border-line between consent and non-consent, or (except for cases
involving s. 43) the border-line between proper and improper touching
of a child by a parent or teacher. Many prosecutions for assaults on
children involve physical injuries that are obviously outside the scope of
any consent, actual or implied, that a child might be able to give; indeed,
some of them involve injuries to which even an adult might not be able to
consent, because of their seriousness.18 So, to test our intuitions about the
application of the possible defences to assault, courts and commentators
have used a number of reasonable hypotheticals in which it is plausibly
asserted that (i) a parent or teacher has intentionally and non-consensually
touched a child, and so has apparently assaulted the child, but (ii) the parent
or teacher should not be found guilty of a criminal offence because the
touching was for a proper purpose and was proportionate to that purpose.
The following five hypothetical cases are meant to fall into this category.
Case # 1.A mother is walking along the sidewalk with her two-year-old
son. The child tries to step into the street, where he would be struck by
an oncoming vehicle. The mother physically restrains the child from
stepping into the street.' 9
Case #2. A father has taken his five-year-old daughter to see a
physician for a routine immunization. The child is very reluctant to
receive the needle. The father physically restraints his daughter while
20
the physician injects the vaccine into the child's arm.

18.
19.
20.

Compare the discussion of Jobidon, supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
Compare CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at para. 199 per Arbour J. dissenting.
Compare ibid.
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Case #3. A grandmother is shopping with her four-year-old grandson in
a toy store. The child asks her to buy him a particular videogame. The
grandmother, knowing that the child's parents have made a considered
decision that the child should not play that game, refuses. The child
then embarks on a full-blown temper tantrum: screaming, shouting,
crying, and rolling on the floor. The grandmother picks up the child
and carries him out of the store.2'
Case #4. A secondary school has a rule prohibiting students from
using cell phones. Students are permitted to have cell phones in their
possession, but the phones must be turned off during school hours. If
a cell phone rings or if a student uses a cell phone to make a call, the
principal has authorized teachers to confiscate the cell phone until the
end of the school day. During her first class of the day, a fourteen-yearold student takes out her cell phone and begins to make a phone call.
Her teacher asks her to turn the phone off and hand it over. The student
refuses and holds the phone held tightly in her hand. The teacher wrests
the phone from the student's hand.22
Case #5. The parents of a six-year-old boy have decided to use "timeouts" as a form of discipline. If the child misbehaves, he will be
required to go to his room for a set period of time. One afternoon, on
arriving home from school, the child hits his four-year-old brother and
takes a toy away from him. His parents decide to send him to his room
for a fifteen-minute time out. The child refuses to go. The father picks
up the child and carries him to his room.23
Before I consider the possible defences available to the parent or other
caregiver in these hypothetical cases, three preliminary points are in
order.
First, in all five of these cases, the use of force by the parent or other
caregiver is applied for a proper purpose and is not excessive, and should
therefore not be subject to criminal sanction. In all cases, the force is for
the purpose of care, protection, or the enforcement of rules. In none of the
cases does the parent or other caregiver intend to injure the child, nor is
any injury caused. Most Canadian legislators, judges, lawyers, and police
officers, not to mention parents and teachers, would regard these uses of
force as appropriate and proportionate methods of carrying out the adult's
21.
22.
23.

Compare Debates of the Senate, No. 144 (4 March 2008) at 899 (Hon. Ethel Cochrane).
Compare Canadian Foundation, supra note 2 at para. 40 per McLachlin C.J.C.
Compare ibid. at para. 62 per McLachlin C.J.C.
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duties in respect of the child in these situations, and therefore as justifiable.
In some of these cases, it may be possible to imagine more effective ways
of dealing with the child's behaviour, but the means actually chosen in
each of these cases should not be criminally punishable.
Second, in at least four of these cases (#2, #3, #4, and #5), if the
complainant was an adult, the use of force would amount to an assault.24
So if the parents and teachers in these examples are entitled to a defence, it
must derive in some way from their status as the child's caregiver.
Third, it has been suggested that the exercise ofprosecutorial discretion
will protect parents and teachers from prosecution in these hypothetical
cases. 2' This view has usually been expressed in support of the contention
that s. 43 of the Code should be repealed outright, without being replaced
by a new statutory defence. There is no question that the proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion is essential to the operation of our criminal
justice system, and few Canadian police officers or prosecutors would
think it was appropriate to lay or to proceed With a charge in any of the
hypothetical cases I have outlined. But prosecutorial discretion, like any
other discretion exercised by a public official, needs to be structured by
principle, and as the law stands, it is not clear what the relevant principles
are in these situations. So, in the interest of certainty and the rule of law,
it would ,be better to express the principles that structure the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion as elements of a defence. Otherwise, the law
of assault as it pertains to children would be grossly over-broad. Overbroad laws invite selective enforcement and overcharging, which creates
uncertainty and shifts decision-making about criminal liability from courts
to police officers and prosecutors. 26 Moreover, if prosecutorial discretion
is for some reason improperly exercised, an accused person has very
few remedies because it is very doubtful whether a trial judge has any
jurisdiction to interfere with the prosecutor's decisions about which cases

24. One could imagine additional facts that would give someone the authority to use the force applied
even to an adult. In case #4, for example, a security guard might well have the authority to remove an
adult shopper who is throwing a temper tantrum from a store. But the adult's grandmother would not.
Case #1 might be an instance of necessity whether the complainant was an adult or a child.
25. This possibility is most extensively explored by Mark Carter, "Corporal Punishment and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Canada" (2004) 12 Int'l J. Children's Rights 41. See also Joan E. Durrant,
"Corporal Punishment: A Violation of the Rights of the Child" in R. Brian Howe & Katherine Covell,
eds., A Question of Commitment: Childrens Rights in Canada (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 2007) 99 at 112; Sharon D. Greene, "The Unconstitutionality of Section 43 of the Criminal
Code: Children's Right to be Protected from Physical Assault, Part 2" (1999) 41 C.L.Q. 462 at 482;
Sheila Noonan, "Annotation" (1984) 41 C.R. (3d) 297 at 299; Stuart, supra note 4 at 530.
26. Compare Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at
c. 1.

12

The Dalhousie Law Journal

to pursue. 7 For this reason, the Supreme Court of Canada has often held
that the existence of prosecutorial discretion is not a reason to uphold a
law that is constitutionally defective; 28 even where the constitutionality of
a law is not in issue, a clear delineation of the scope of criminal liability
29
is preferable to reliance onprosecutorial discretion.
2. Section 43 of the Criminal Code
The defence of "reasonable force by way of correction" codified in s. 43
of the Criminal Code may appear, on the face of the law, to be the only
defence currently available for the non-consensual application of force to
a child; it is certainly the only section of the Code that speaks explicitly
to this situation. If a parent, teacher, or person standing in the place of a
parent uses reasonable force "by way of correction toward a pupil or child
... who is under his care," s. 43 states that the use of force is "justified"
and so not an offence. As noted above, the availability of this defence
remains controversial, and there is little doubt that it will be the subject of
future Parliamentary debate.
In CanadianFoundation,the Supreme Court of Canada considered
several Charter challenges to s. 43. The majority, per McLachlin C.J.C.,
interpreted the phrase "force [that] does not exceed what is reasonable
under the circumstances" quite narrowly and specifically:
Generally, s. 43 exempts from criminal sanction only minor corrective
force of a transitory and trifling nature. On the basis of current expert
consensus, it does not apply to corporal punishment of children under
two or teenagers. Degrading, inhuman or harmful conduct is not
protected. Discipline by the use of objects or blows or slaps to the head
is unreasonable. Teachers may reasonably apply force to remove a child
from a classroom or secure compliance with instructions, but not merely
as corporal punishment. Coupled with the requirement that the conduct
be corrective, which rules out conduct stemming from the caregiver's
frustration, loss of temper or abusive personality, a consistent picture
emerges of the area covered by s. 43. It is wrong for law enforcement
officers or judges to apply their own subjective views of what is
"reasonable under the circumstances"; the test is objective. The question
must be considered in context and in light of all the circumstances of the
case. The gravity of the precipitating event is not relevant.3"
27. On the limits of judicial review of prosecutorial decisions, see Kent Roach, "The Attorney
General and the Charter of Rights Revisited" (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 1. For a corporal punishment case
where a'court stayed proceedings for what it saw as a misuse of prosecutorial discretion, see R. v. K.
(M.) (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 108 (Man.C.A.). In this case, the influence of the judge's personal views
about corporal punishment was so substantial that few advocates of repealing s. 43 would agree with
the decision to stay the proceedings.
28. See, e.g., R. v. Hess, R. v. Nguyen, [199012 S.C.R. 906 at 924per Wilson J.
29. Compare CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at para. 63 per McLachlin C.J.C.
30. CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at para. 40.
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With this narrow interpretation in hand, the majority held that s. 43 was
not unconstitutionally vague, was not overbroad, did not offend a child's
right against cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, and
did not offend children's equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter. The
majority also rejected the argument that the "best interests of the child"
was a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, at least
in the criminal law context, and therefore did not have to decide whether
31
retaining the s. 43 defence was in the best interests of children.
The decision in CanadianFoundation has been severely criticized on
numerous grounds, in particular, the quality of the constitutional analysis,
the court's quasi-legislative reinterpretation of s. 43, and the court's failure
to accept the claim that corporal punishment is never good for children.32
Moreover, it has been argued that the retention of s. 43 is inconsistent
with Canada's international obligations.3 3 While I am sympathetic to these
criticisms, the object of this paper is not to analyze CanadianFoundation
any further, but to consider the more general problem of non-consensual
touching of children. Indeed, the hypothetical cases presented above show
that the retention or repeal of s. 43 does not answer the question posed in
this paper either way. In cases #1 and #2, s. 43 would not be applicable, as

31. Binnie J., dissenting in part, would have held that s. 43 offended s. 15, but would have upheld
the s. 15 violation in the case of parents; Deschamps J.would have struck the section down on s.15
grounds; and Arbour J. would have struck the section down on s. 7 grounds.
32. See Stuart, supranote 4 at529-30; Katie Sykes, "Bambi Meets Godzilla: Children's and Parents'
Rights in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada" (2006) 51 McGill L.J.

131; Mayo Moran, "Protesting Too Much: Rational Basis Review Under Canada's Equality Guarantee"
in S. Rodgers & S. McIntyre, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charterof

Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 71 at 84-8; Anne McGillivray & Joan E. Durrant,
"Child Corporal Punishment: Violence, Law, and Rights" in Ramona Maggia & Cathy Vine, eds.,
Cruel but not unusual: Violence in Canadianfamilies (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,

2006) 117 [McGillivray & Durrant]; Marianne Hardy-Dussault, "Un facteur contextuel sous influence
ou les pi~ges de la pertinence : Canadian Foundationfor Children, Youth and the Law" (2005-06)
36 R.D.U.S. 327; Judith Mossoff & Isabel Grant, "Upholding Corporal Punishment: For Whose

Benefit?" (2005) 31 Man.L.J. 177; Sanjeev Anand, "Reasonable Chastisement: A Critique of the
Supreme Court's Decision in the 'Spanking' Case" (2004) 41 Alta.L.Rev. 871 [Anand]; Mark Carter,
"The Constitutional Validity of the Corporal Punishment Defence in Canada: A Critical Analysis of
Canadian)Foundationfor Children, Youth and the Law versus Canada (Attorney General)" (2005) 12

Int'l Rev. of Victimology 189; Janine Benedet, "Hierarchies of Harm in Canadian Criminal Law: The
Marijuana Trilogy and the Forcible 'Correction' of Children" (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 217; Cheryl
Milne, "The Limits of Children's Rights under Section 7 of the Charter: Life, No Liberty and Minimal
Security of the Person" (2004) 17 N.J.C.L. 199.

33. Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Human Rights, "Children: The Silenced Citizens:
Effective Implementation of Canada's International Obligations with Respect to the Rights of
Children" in Sessional Papers,No. 1/39-7805 (2007); McGillivray & Durrant, ibid.
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the force applied to the child in these cases is not "by way of correction"34
but for the child's health or protection. Section 43 might apply to justify
the grandmother, teacher, or parents in the remaining cases, but they are
far from the sort of corporal punishment that is usually associated with
s. 43. So the question posed in this paper will remain whether or not s.
43 is repealed: what doctrine of Canadian law gives parents (and other
caregivers) the right to touch children without the children's consent?
3. Common law defences
Section 8(3) of the Criminal Code provides that every common law
defence "continues in force and applies ...
except in so far as [it is] altered
by or [is] inconsistent with" the Code or other federal statutes. Moreover,
while all criminal offences (except contempt of court) are now codified
in the Criminal Code and other federal statutes, the interpretation of the
offence definitions are often influenced by the common law background.
By both of these routes, criminal law defences continue to exist at common
law and to be developed by Canadian courts. Defences that have been
recognized under s. 8(3) include necessity, duress, 35 entrapment, 36 and
officially induced error.37 These defences are excuses; but a new common
law justification might also be recognized under s. 8(3). A defence that
operates by negating an element of the offence can also be recognized,
either by interpreting the elements of the offence in light of the common
law or through s. 8(3).38
The three common law defences that I consider here are the defence
of necessity, the defence of de minimis non curat lex, and the defence of
deemed consent.

34. This point has often been made; see, for example, Canadian Foundation, supra note 2 at para.
199 per Arbour J. dissenting; Debates ofthe Senate, No. 144 (14 November 2007) at 213 (Hon. Cdline
Hervieux-Payette) (noting that forcing an unwilling child into a seatbelt is not a form of punishment
but compliance with a legal obligation). To be "by way of correction," the force must be applied "for
educative or corrective purposes," that is, be "designed to restrain, control or express some symbolic
disapproval of [the child's] behaviour": Canadian Foundation, supra note 2 at para. 24. The use of
force motivated by anger or frustration with a child's behaviour is not justified by s.43: R. v. Sinclair
(2008), 229 C.C.C.(3d) 485 (Man.C.A.).
35. Criminal Code, supra note I at s.17, provides a limited defence of duress, but the common law
defence is available to certain parties to offences (Paquette v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 189) and
where the application of s. 17 would be unconstitutional (R. v. Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
687).
36. R. v. Mack, [1988]2 S.C.R. 903.
37. Levis (City) v. Tdtreault; Ldvis (City) v. 2629-4470 Qudbec inc., 2006 SCC 12, [2006] 1 S.C.R.
420.
38. See, for instance, Jobidon, supra note 14, where Gonthier J. used both of these strategies to
incorporate common law policy limits on consent that would otherwise negate an assault.
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a. The defence of necessity
The Supreme Court has recognized, at common law, an excuse of necessity
in cases where the accused commits an offence in response to an extremely
urgent situation. Most recently, in Latimer, the court restated the defence
as follows:
...
three elements ... must be present for the defence of necessity. First,
there is the requirement of imminent peril or danger. Second, the accused
must have had no reasonable legal alternative to the course of action he
or she undertook. Third, there must
be proportionality between the harm
39
inflicted and the harm avoided.
The first requirement is very stringent. A situation of imminent peril or
danger means that "disaster must be imminent, or harm unavoidable and
near. It is not enough that the peril is foreseeable or likely; it must be on
the verge of transpiring and virtually certain to occur."4 Or, as stated in
Perka:
At a minimum the situation must be so emergent and the peril must be
so pressing that normal human instincts cry out for action and make a
counsel of patience unreasonable ...
The second requirement is that there was no reasonable alternative to
breaking the law. "If an alternative to breaking the law exists, the defence
of necessity on this aspect fails."42 The third requirement is that "[t]he
harm inflicted must not be disproportionate to the harm the accused sought
to avoid. 4 3 All three requirements must be present for the defence to
succeed."
The defence of necessity is so stringent that it would fail in the vast
majority of cases where touching a child was a justifiable response to
the situation facing the parent or other caregiver. The first element of the
defence would normally be lacking because most uses of force against

39. R. v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 28. The defence was held to have no air of reality on the
facts of the case. The court had previously recognized the defence, in principle, in R. v. Morgentaler,
[1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, and in Perka, supra note 17, though in neither'case was it decided whether the
accused was entitled to the defence on the facts.
40.. Ibid. at para. 29.
41. Perka,supranote 17 at 251.
42. Latimer,supra note 39 at para. 30.
43. Ibid. at para. 31.
44. As with any other defence, the accused must show that the defence has an "air of reality"; if
this evidentiary burden is satisfied, to obtain a conviction, the Crown must disprove the defence. But
where the defence has several elements, the defence will fail if the Crown disproves at least one of the
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
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a child are not responses to emergency situations.45 Indeed, the defence
of necessity would be available in only the first of the five hypothetical
situations outlined above. In Case #1, the parent's use of force to prevent
the child from stepping into traffic would be a response to an imminent
peril; there would be no legal alternative; and the minor force used would
obviously be proportional to the harm avoided. But the remaining cases
would all fail to satisfy the first requirement: none of them exhibits the
imminent disaster or unavoidable harm that must be present for the defence
of necessity to apply. Consider Case #2. It is undoubtedly important for the
child to receive the immunization, both for her own sake and for the sake
of public health in general. But if she does not, neither she nor anyone else
will be in imminent peril; disaster will not strike if she is not vaccinated
that day. Or consider Case #4. It is very important for a teacher to have
the power to enforce the school's rules in her classroom. But a student's
threatened use of a cell phone, even in blatant defiance of the school's rules,
hardly amounts to imminent disaster. To put the point another way, the fact
that a person is trying to achieve something important is insufficient to
trigger the application of the defence of necessity._
So the defence of necessity would provide no protection to parents
and other caregivers in the vast majority of situations where, for a proper
purpose (as defined above), they need to touch or otherwise apply force to
children under their care.
b. The defence of de minimis
The common law defence of de minimis non curat lex is meant to excuse
4' 6
trivial infractions of the law. The defence is often traced to The "Reward.
After commenting that it was not the court's function to correct "unwise"
legislation but to "administer the law as it stands," the court continued:
The Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in the
application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied in the
ancient maxim De minimis non curat lex.-Where there are irregularities
of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of
penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle,
which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the

45. Palombi, supra note 5 at para. 29. Compare R. v. B. WS., [2006] S.J. No. 532 (Prov.Ct.). The
accused was charged with assault with a weapon after he struck his thirteen-year-old autistic step-son
with a belt; this conduct was a reaction to the complainant's repeated efforts to run away from home.
The trial judge rejected the defence of necessity because "the use of the belt on the complainant ... was
excessive and unnecessary" (para. 44). But the defence could also have been rejected on the ground
that the first element was lacking: while preventing the complainant from running away might have
been a response to an imminent emergency, punishing him after his return was not.
46. The "Reward'"(1818), 2 Dods. 265, 165 E.R. 1482 (Eng. Adm. Ct.).
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public interest, it might properly be overlooked.47
The defence was, however, rejected on the facts of the case.48
The de minimis defence does not negate an element of the offence or
justify the conduct; rather, it is applied where the prosecution can prove
all the elements of the offence but the offence is, in the circumstances,
so trifling that in the court's judgment criminal liability should not be
imposed. "The defence of de minimis does not mean that the act is justified;
it remains unlawful, but on account of its triviality it goes unpunished."49
It may serve as a check on a failure of prosecutorial discretion and as a
way of avoiding the trivialization of the criminal sanction.
There are three problems with reliance on the de minimis defence as a
solution to the problem of a parent or caregiver's touching of a child. First,
it is not clear whether Canadian criminal law recognizes the defence of
de minimis at all. Second, even if it is a defence in general, it may not be
available on a charge of assault. Third, and most significantly, even if the
de minimis defence is available on a charge of assault, it would not apply
to many cases of the use of force towards a child for a proper purpose. I
outline each of these problems in turn.
The Criminal Code does not provide a defence of de minimis, and
the case law presents a mixed picture as to whether the defence- exists at
common law. There is indeed some support for the existence of the de
minimis defence in certain alcohol, drug, and theft cases,5" as well as in
academic commentary." But some of the cases cited in support of the

47. Ibid. at 1484. This passage is frequently quoted; see, e.g., CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at
para. 202.
48. The court upheld the forfeiture of several tons of wood that had been illegally exported from
Jamaica to the United States.
49. CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at para. 203; compare R. v. Daniels, [2001] S.J. No. 503 at
para. 21 (Prov.Ct.), where the defence was rejected on the facts of the case.
50. R. v. Overvold (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 517 at 419-21 (N.W.T. Mag. Ct.) (de minimis defence
applied to trace amount of hashish not shown to be remnant of a larger amount previously in accused's
possession) [Overvold]; R. v. S. (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 181 at 186 (Man. Prov. Ct.) (de minimis maxim
applied where amount of marijuana in question was too small to use); R. v. Marusiak, [2002] A.J. No.
1048 (Q.B.) (QL) (accused acquitted of possession of trace amount of crack cocaine on basis of de
minimis doctrine) [Marusiak];R. v. Appleby (1990), 78 C.R. (3d) 282 (Ont.Prov.Ct.) (high-profile theft
charges stayed on basis of de minimis maxim).
51. See e.g. Stuart, supra note 4 at 624-29; Jean Htu, "Droit judiciaire: De minimis non curat
praetor: une maxime qui a toute son importance!" (1990) 50 R. du B. 1065.
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defence in fact reach an acquittal by other routes.52 And some courts have
held that the defence does not apply to certain offences,53 or does not exist
at all.54
If there is a de minimis defence to some offences, there is further
doubt as to whether it applies to the offence of assault. As noted in Part 1.2
above, there is no threshold level of force required to constitute an assault:
the slightest intentional, non-consensual touching is an assault. The
rationale for this broad definition of assault is that even the slightest nonconsensual touching interferes with the personal dignity and autonomy of
the complainant:
Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical
and psychological, of every individual. Having control over who touches
one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy.
The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses
society's determination to protect the security of the person from
any non-consensual contact or threats of force. The common law has
recognized for centuries that the individual's right to physical integrity
is a fundamental principle, "every man's person being sacred, and no

52. See R. v. McBurney (1975), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 44 (B.C.C.A.), aff'g 15 C.C.C. (2d) 361 (B.C.S.C.).
The accused was acquitted of possession of a "minute trace" of cannabis resin on ground that a "minute
trace is evidence of earlier possession [but] does not establish present possession"; the court found that
it was "not necessary to invoke the maxim de minimis non curat lex": ibid. at 46. Note also the same
court's subsequent decision in R. v. Brett (1986), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 190 (B.C.C.A.) (see note 53 infra.)
[Brett]. Some cases cited on point are probably obiter dicta: R. v. Peleshaty (1949), 96 C.C.C 147
(Man.C.A.) (accused acquitted of unlawful possession of 10 drops of liquor because the Crown had
not proved mens rea; in the alternative, de minimis maxim applicable); Overold, supra note 50 (even
if de minimis maxim not applicable, Crown had failed to proved rnens rea); Marusiak, supra note 50
(trial judge erred in convicting accused after accepting his testimony that he was not aware of the trace
amount of cocaine).
53. In R. v. Battie (1985), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 49 (B.C.Co. Ct.) and R. v. Keizer (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d)
440 (N.S.S.C.) it was held that the defence of de minimis was inapplicable to offence of possession of
narcotics. This result is consistent with Brett, supranote 52, where it was held that to prove possession
of a narcotic, the Crown was not required to prove that the amount possessed was usable. These
holdings are in various respects contrary to the cases cited in note 50 above. In R. v. Carson (2004),
185 C.C.C. (3d) 541 atpara. 25 (Ont.C.A.), the court implied that the de minimis defence was not
applicable to allegations of domestic violence. See also R. v. A.S.B., [2006] B.C.J. No. 3447 at para. 18
(Prov.Ct.); R. v.Downey, [2002] N.S.J. No. 442 at paras. 35-38 (S.C.); R. v. Stewart, [19961 O.J. No.
2704 (Prov.Div.). But other courts have refused to exclude the de minimis defence in cases of alleged
domestic assault: see R. v.McLeod, [2006] A.J. No. 644 (Prov.Ct.) (de minimis defence applied in the
alternative, to an allegation of domestic assault); R. v. Peniston,[2003] N.S.J. No. 29 at para. 31 (Prov.
Ct.) (touching was consensual or, in the alternative, de minimis).
54. R. v. Li (1984), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 382 at 384 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Juliano,[2002] O.J. No. 699 at para.
24 (S.C.); R. v. D.K., [2004] O.J. No. 4676 at para. 14 (C.J. R. v. Hinchey, [199613 S.C.R. 1128 at para.
69 [Hinchey]. Here, L'Heureux-Dub6 J.briefly considered the defence, but limited herself to noting
that "this principle's potential application as a defence to criminal culpability has not yet been decided
by this Court, and would appear to be the subject of some debate in the courts below." Since the
principle would not be applicable to the facts of the case, she preferred "to leave the issue for another
day."
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other having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner": see
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th ed. 1770),
Book III, at p. 120. It follows that any intentional but unwanted touching
is criminal. 5
Recognizing a defence of de minimis would arguably be inconsistent with
this rationale for the offence of assault. If the purpose of the law of assault
is to protect "human dignity and autonomy" by deterring and punishing
non-consensual applications of force, then the degree of force applied
should be irrelevant.
Notwithstanding this line of reasoning, some courts have recognized
a de minimis defence to assault. These cases tend to involve angry,
sometimes politicized, confrontations between adult men;5 6 underlying

the reasoning in these cases there may be an unspoken assumption that
grown men should be able to tolerate a degree of minor pushing and
shoving. More importantly, while a majority of the Supreme Court has
never recognized the de minimis defence,57 two judges of that court have
recognized it as a possible defence to assault. In Cuerrier,8 the Supreme
Court considered a case of aggravated assault based on the allegation that
the accused had had unprotected sex with two women without disclosing
that he was HIV-positive. The theory of the Crown was that his failure

55. Ewanchuk, supra note 8 at para. 28 per lacobucci J. Ewanchuk was a case of sexual assault, but
these comments are applicable to all forms of assault.
56. See, for instance, R. v.Kormos (1998), 14 C.R. (5th) 312 (Ont.Prov.Div) [Kormos]. The accused
was a member of the provincial legislature who was involved in a confrontation with a security guard
at a government office and was charged with assault. The trial judge, after a careful review of the
evidence, found that that "[t]he evidence, at its highest, shows an insignificant amount of physical
contact by Mr. Kormos", and that if it was criminal conduct, was excused as de minimis. See also R. v.
LePage (1989), 74 C.R. (3d) 368 at 375 (Sask.Q.B.): during a dispute about the storage of Christmas
trees, the accused brushed or pushed past a fire inspector. He was convicted at trial, but the summary
conviction appeal judge allowed the accused's appeal, holding that the intention to apply force had
not been proved and that the force applied was "trifling". See also R. v. Freedman, [2006] Q.J. No.
1248 (C.Q.) at para. 36, aff'd [2006] J.Q. No. 12166 (C.S.), where the accused was charged with
two offences arising out-of a confrontation between the accused and a police officer who ticketed
the accused's vehicle. The trial judge rejected the officer's evidence in respect of one charge; with
respect to the other, the trial judge found a minor, non-consensual touching, but applied the de minimis
maxim and acquitted the accused. The Crown's appeal was dismissed. But see R. v Kubassek (2004),
188 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (Ont.C.A.). The accused assaulted a minister during a protest against a same-sex
marriage. The trial judge acquitted on the ground that the assault was de minimis. The Crown's appeal
was dismissed, but a further appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed. The court found it unnecessary
to decide whether the de minimis principle was a defence because the court held that the assault, on the
facts found by the trial judge, was not de minimis.
57. Compare R. v.Persaud,[2007] O.J. No. 1752 at para. 48 (S.C.J.J, Anand, supra note 32. Since
the court has probably never had a set of facts that would call for the application of the defence, it
would be a mistake to read too much into the court's failure to identify it as a defence that is preserved
under s. 8(3).
58. Cuerrier,supranote 11.
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to disclose his HIV status amounted to fraud negating consent under s.
265(3)(c) of the CriminalCode. While the entire court agreed that the facts
alleged by the Crown in that case would, if proved, establish the accused's
guilt,59 there was sharp disagreement about the proper test for fraud in
this context. L'Heureux-Dub6 J., speaking for herself, proposed a very
broad test, according to which any dishonesty that induced any touching
would undermine consent. Her colleagues objected that this test would
criminalize innumerable minor social interactions. She replied to this
objection in a number of ways, one of which was to invoke the de minimis
maxim: she argued that if the Crown were "foolish enough to prosecute a
case of assault by handshake or social buss," the de minimis maxim might
well be applicable.6" In Canadian Foundation,Arbour J. responded in a
somewhat similar way to those who suggested that the invalidation of s. 43
would lead to a flood of absurd charges against parents. She commented
that in the absence of s. 43, the de minimis principle "will suffice to ensure
that parents and teachers are not branded as criminals for their trivial use
of force to restrain children when appropriate."'" After reviewing the
Canadian case law concerning the defence, she said:
I am of the view that an appropriate expansion in the use of the de
minimis defence - not unlike the development of the doctrine of abuse
of process - would assist in ensuring that mere technical violations
of the assault provisions of the Code that ought not to attract criminal
sanctions are stayed. In this way, judicial resources are not wasted, and
unwanted intrusions of the criminal law in the family context, which may
be harmful to children, are avoided. Therefore, if s. 43 were to be struck
down, and absent Parliament's re-enactment of a provision compatible
with the constitutional rights of children, parents would be no more at
risk of being dragged into court for a "pat on the bum"
than they currently
62
are for "tasting" a single grape in the supermarket.
These statements by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. and Arbour J. represent the
strongest endorsement, so far, of the defence of de minimis non curat lex
in Canadian criminal law.

59. The accused was alleged to have-had unprotected sex with two women without disclosing that
he was HIV-positive. He was charged with aggravated assault, on the theory that his failure to disclose
was fraud vitiating consent within the meaning of s.265(3)(c), and that the unprotected sex endangered
the complainants' lives.
60. Cuerrier,supra note I I at para. 21. L'Heureux-Dubd J.'s reliance on the de minimis defence is
especially striking because of her previously expressed hesitation to endorse it: Hinchey, supra note
54 at para. 69.
61. Canadian Foundation, supra note 2 at para. 132.
62. Ibid. at para. 207.
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But even if the defence is eventually recognized by a majority of the
court and is applied to assaults, it would not apply to most of the hypothetical
cases given above because the degree of force used in each is well beyond
the trifling. In cases where the de minimis defence has been applied to what
would otherwise be an assault, the accused's contact with the complainant
63
was quite trivial: a minor push or touching in the context of an argument,
light touches on the arm and chest of the complainant. 64 Contrast these
minor touchings with the degree of force used in the hypotheticals. In
Case #2, the father restrains the child while a physician injects her with a
vaccine. Neither the restraint nor the injection could plausibly be described
as de minimis. In Cases #3 through #5, a significant degree of force might
well be required to remove the child from the store, to take the cell phone
from the student's hand, or to keep the child in his room. To see that these
uses of force are not de minimis, imagine that in these cases that the person
restrained is an adult. It would be quite implausible to describe the degree
of force required to make an adult submit to a nonconsensual injection or
to restrain an adult in a room as trifling.
Moreover, the de minimis defence is an excuse; that is, the accused's
act remains wrongful but is not punished. In all of the hypothetical cases
above, the parent or caregiver's conduct is, in the circumstances, the right
thing to do. So even if the conduct could somehow be characterized as
trifling, excusing it through the defence of de miminis would send the
wrong message: it. would say that the parent or other caregiver had done
something wrong, not that he or she had used force that was permissible
and proportionate. Indeed, in some cases, the force used would be required
by other legal rules; for example, in Case #1, the mother's duty to care for
her child would demand, rather than prohibit, her use-.of force to prevent
the child from running into traffic.
The defence de minimis non curat lex, assuming it exists in Canadian
law and applies to the offence of assault, would provide insufficient
protection to parents, teachers, and other caregivers in many situations
where they need to touch or otherwise apply force to the children under
their care.
c.

The defence of deemed consent

The nature of the defence
A child is a person, but he or she is a person who is in the course of
physical and psychological development and so is dependent on adults for
63.
64.

See the cases cited in note 56 supra.
Kormos, supra note 56.
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food, shelter, protection, and education (among other goods and services).
The child's parents are primarily responsible for providing the child with
these goods and, more generally, for preparing them to become adults.
Consequently, parents have quite stringent legal obligations to care for
their children. These obligations existed at common law and today are
imposed by statute.65 The rights that parents have over their children, visA-vis other adults, the state, and the children themselves, flow only partly
from the parents' interest in having a relationship from their children;
much more importantly, they flow from the parents' need to have these
rights to carry out their duties to the children. As Kant put it, parents "have
brought a person into the world without his consent and on [their] own
initiative, for which deed the parents incur an obligation to make the child
content with his condition so far as they can."66 The "right of parents to
manage and develop the child, as long as he has not yet mastered the use
of his members or of his understanding" derives from this duty; it is a right
of the parents against other adults, but it is at the same time the parents'
duty towards the child.67 The right that parents have to raise and to care
for their children is of a fiduciary nature: it is to be exercised primarily in
the children's interest, not the parents'.6 8
One of the necessary incidents of the parent's duty to the child is that
the parent must be able to touch the child (apply force to the child) for the
purposes of caring for the child, providing him or her with the necessaries
of life (including food, shelter, clothing, and medical care), and educating
him or her. The parent must be able to touch the child for these purposes
whether or not the child consents; that is, these touchings seem to meet
the definition of assault. Yet it is quite implausible to argue that there is
something wrong with these touchings or that they are all assaults that are
65. See, for example, CriminalCode, supranote I at s. 215; Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s.
2.31; Art. 32 C.c.Q.
66. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996) at 64.
67. Ibid. at 65, original emphasis.
68. The derivation of parental rights from the parent's duty to the child is at least as old as William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765) at 434,
440, though some of Blackstone's views about specific parental rights are archaic and unacceptable
(as indeed were some of Kant's). For more modem discussions of the relationship between parental
rights and parental duties, see Bernard Dickens, "The Modem Function and Limits of Parental
Rights" (1981) 97 Law Q. Rev. 462 at 464, 471; Andrew Bainham, Children: The Modern Law,
2d ed. (Bristol: Family Law, 1998) at 78-104; David Archard, Children: Rights and the Law, 2d ed.
(London: Routledge, 2004) at 149-52; B. (R.) v. ChildrentAid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995]
1 S.C.R. 315 at paras. 85-86 per La Forest J.; Winnipeg Child andFamily Services v. W.(K.L.), [2000]
2 S.C.R 519 at paras. 72-3 per L'Heureux-Dube J. For statutory statements of the "best interests of the
child" principle, see, among others, Children' Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12, s. 20(2); Art. 33
C.c.Q.
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not prosecuted because of prosecutorial discretion. Thus, to recognize the
parent's need to touch a child in carrying out his or her parental duties,
the common law recognizes a defence of deemed (or implied) consent to
parental applications of force that are done for a proper purpose.
The common law defence of deemed consent
The common law defence of deemed consent is rarely seen in the case
law because parents are, in practice, rarely if ever prosecuted in situations
where the defence would apply. Nonetheless, the defence has been raised
and recognized in a number of recent cases, although there do not appear
to be any cases where the defence has, on the facts, exonerated a parent or
other caregiver.
The leading Canadian case concerning the defence of deemed consent
is E.(A). 69 The accused father had injured his two-month-old daughter
and was charged with assault causing bodily harm. The accused testified
that he caused the injuries inadvertently while caring for his child. The trial
judge rejected his evidence, found that the accused had assaulted the child
without any justification or excuse whatsoever, and convicted him. In light
of the trial judge's factual findings, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed
the accused's appeal from conviction.7" But the court, per Weiler J.A.,
also commented as follows on the defence of deemed or implied consent:
[T]he common law recognizes the right of a parent to apply force in a
reasonable manner for the benefit of the child

On the one hand, the law must protect children and those who are
defenceless from unwarranted bodily interference; on the other hand,
persons engaged in looking after a child must be protected from state
interference when acting in the best interests of the child. Accordingly
... it is in the public interest that an infant be deemed to consent to

applications of force by a parent done 'for the good of the child and,
indeed, for the survival of the child' .12

The deemed consent of a child to the intentional application of force by
a parent is limited at common law to the customary norms of parenting
or what a reasonable parent would do in similar circumstances. This is
69. R.v.E.(A.) (2000), 146 CCC. (3d) 449 (Ont.C.A.) [E.(A)].
70. The decisions at trial and on appeal are quite unsurpising in light of the serious injuries, including
multiple fractures of the leg bones and ribs, suffered by the child.
71. E.(A), supranote 69 at para. 26.
72. Ibid.
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an objective standard. ... There appears to be general agreement that
a parent has the right to apply force to a child when it is necessary to
protect the child, to protect others (such as a younger sibling), and to
teach a child social values and behavioural limits.73
The court added that where the force used by a parent does not respect
these limits, then "the deemed consent of the child is vitiated"7 4 and the
parent is guilty of assault.
Similarly, in Palombi,75 the Ontario Court of Appeal explained the
defence of deemed consent as arising from the parents' duties towards
their children:
Infants ...
require care that will call for the intentional, although usually
minor, application of force. In addition, parents have a statutory and
common law duty to provide the necessaries of life to children under
their care. ... Again, the performance of this type of duty will require the
use of force. It is awkward to attempt to excuse the use of force through
the application of the rigorous standards of the necessity defence. The
courts have instead developed the concept of deemed consent.

[D]eemed or implied consent in the case of infants 'must be strictly
limited to conduct that is "consistent with the purpose and rationale
underlying the policy basis for the consent." That policy basis is the
child's incapacity to care for him or herself. It follows that only force
necessary to care for the child can be justified.76
The court added that "the force used must have been for the purpose of
'78
caring for the child ' 77 and that "the force used must not be excessive.
These limits are wholly consistent with the rationale of the defence, in that
the defence provides a right to use force to be exercised in the discharge of
a duty towards the child.79
In light of E. (A.) and Palombi, the common law defence of a child's
deemed consent to the application of force by a parent or other caregiver

73. Ibid.at para. 40.
74. Ibid.at para. 41.
75. Supra note 5. The accused mother was convicted of aggravated assault and failing to provide
the necessaries of life to her son, who was about six weeks old at the time of the alleged offences. The
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on a ground that is not directly relevant here.
76. Ibid. at paras. 29-30.
77. Ibid. at paras. 30, 32.
78. Ibid.at para. 32.
79. For recent cases where the defence was rejected on the facts, see R. v. Tom, 2007 BCSC 1407,
[2007] B.C.J. No. 2064 [Tom]; R. v. D.P, [2004] N.J. No. 38 (Prov.Ct.). For an unusual combination of
the defence of deemed consent and s. 43 of the Code, leading to an acquittal of a father charged with
assaulting his teen-aged daughter, see R. v. B.S. (2008), 58 C.R. (6 ' ) 126 [B.S.].
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may be restated as follows. Parents and other caregivers (including
teachers) are justified in applying reasonable force to children under their
care for the purpose of carrying out their duties to the children, including
providing the children with the necessaries of life, caring for the children,
providing the children with medical treatment and care, protecting the
children from danger, enforcing the rules of the home or the school,
preventing and responding to inappropriate behaviour by the children, and
demonstrating appropriate limits on behaviour. The force used must not
be excessive to the purpose; moreover, the defence of deemed consent
does not justify the intentional infliction of harm, degrading treatment,
or actions taken in anger. The justification for the use of force is assessed
from the perspective of the reasonable parent in the circumstances.
The defence of deemed consent would, in my view, justify the parent's
or caregiver's conduct in each of the five hypothetical cases provided above.
In Case #1, the mother applies force for the purpose of protecting her son.
In Case #2, the father applies force for the purpose of having his daughter
receive necessary medical care. In Case #3, the grandmother carries her
grandson out of the store to demonstrate that his temper tantrum is not an
appropriate response to his disappointment. In Case #4, the teacher takes
the phone from the student to enforce the reasonable rules of the school.
In Case #5, the force is applied as part of a moderate disciplinary response
to misbehaviour. In all five cases, the force used is within the norms of
reasonable parenting, neither causes nor is intended to cause harm, and
does not amount to corporal punishment.
Some problems with the defence of deemed consent
The common law defence of deemed consent does appear to provide a
satisfactory defence to parents and other caregivers who touch a child,
with or without the child's consent, for appropriate purposes related to their
duty to care for and raise the child. If developed along the lines indicated
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in E.(A.) and Palombi, the defence would
provide a satisfactory answer to the question posed at the outset of this
paper. But there are three potential problems with the defence. First, the
Supreme Court has never recognized it under s. 8(3) of the Code. Second,
in addition to justifiable uses -offorce, the defence of deemed consent may
also be interpreted to include corporal punishment, in a way that would
likely be contrary to the intention of the Supreme Court of Canada's
reinterpretation of s. 43 and would certainly be contrary to the growing
social consensus against corporal punishment. Third, the use of the word
"consent" may introduce an element of artificiality into the defence, as the
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child has no real choice about participating in the activity which gives rise
to the defence. I consider these points in turn.
The Supreme Court of Canada has never had the opportunity to
consider the defence of deemed consent. Moreover, none of the judges
in Canadian Foundation mentions the defence. This omission is odd in
light of the court's discussion of other possible defences; the existence of
the defence would have been highly relevant on the issue of the effect of
striking down s. 43. But the court's failure to mention the defence should
not be taken as a holding that it does not exist at common law, particularly
since the court was not dealing with a specific set of facts in which the
defence might have been pleaded. Indeed, as far as I am aware, the court
has never had such a case. Like any other common law defence recognized
under s. 8(3), the defence of deemed consent would have to be pleaded at
trial by an accused person, and the trial judge's decision to recognize or
reject it would have to be appealed to the Supreme Court before that court
could definitively recognizeit. So the court's failure to recognize it in the
past is no obstacle to recognizing it in the future.
As is apparent in hypothetical Case #5, the defence of deemed consent
can justify the use of force "by way of correction." But how far can
this use of force go? Does it include not just physical restraints for the
purposes of imposing a relatively mild punishment such as a "time-out"
but also corporal punishment? That was certainly Blackstone's view. 80 In
other words, s. 43 was itself rooted in the common law idea of the child's
deemed consent,8 so that the defence of deemed consent may apply to uses
of disciplinary force that s. 43 does not, in light of CanadianFoundation,
currently justify. Indeed, a superior court judge recently commented that
"deemed consent may apply to the application of minor corrective force
such as hitting [the complainant child] on the hand,"82 even though s. 43
was inapplicable because the complainant was less than two years of age.83
This comment illustrates a danger associated with exclusive reliance on the
defence of deemed consent: it may, depending on its judicial development,
permit parents and other caregivers who are accused of striking children to
successfully argue that corporal punishment is permitted at common law,
beyond what is permitted under s. 43.

80. Blackstone, supra note 68 at 440-41.
81. Compare Ogg-Moss v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 173 at 188; see also the reasoning in B.S.,
supra note 79.
82. Tom, supra note 79 at para. 103. However, the accused's conduct went well beyond that, and the
defence of deemed consent was rejected on the facts of the case.
83. This limit is a result of the restrictive interpretation of s. 43 adopted in CanadianFoundation,
supra note 2 at para. 37.
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Moreover, the word "consent" in the phrase "deemed consent" is
somewhat artificial, in that the child does not actually consent to anything
at any time in the course of conduct that leads up to the use of force by
the parent. Indeed, very young children could not meaningfully be said
to consent or to refuse consent to parental touching.8 4 In this respect, the
defence of deemed consent differs from the defence of implied consent
(though the two phrases are sometimes taken to mean the same thing). The
defence of implied consent applies because of the complainant's willing
participation in an activity, such as a hockey game or a social occasion;
having decided to participate, he or she is then taken to have agreed to
the applications of force that are normally part of that activity. But, by
the same token, the complainant can withdraw the implied consent by
withdrawing from the activity - he or she can leave the hockey game
or exit the social occasion. Although the complainant does not actually
consent to each individual application of force, he or she does actually
consent to participation in the activity as a whole. The defence of deemed
consent does not have this feature because the child has no choice about
being a child and cannot withdraw from his or her relationship with the
parent or other caregiver. The child did not ask to be born; the relationship
itself is not consensual. So "deemed consent" may not be the most suitable
phrase to describe the defence.
These considerations suggest that it might be desirable for Parliament
to provide a statutory replacement for the defence of deemed consent,
drawing on the same underlying idea but avoiding the phrase "deemed
consent" itself. In the rest of this paper, I consider possible statutory
versions of the defence.
Statutory defences of "parentalcontrol"
The idea of providing a statutory version of the defence of deemed consent
has recently been taken up by the New Zealand Parliament and by the
Senate of Canada. However, the defences enacted in New Zealand and
proposed by the Senate are considerably narrower than the common law
defence of deemed consent; indeed, they are so narrow that, by themselves,
they do not provide satisfactory answers to the question of when a parent,
teacher,. or other caregiver can touch a child without the child's consent.
In 2007, the New Zealand Parliament repealed s. 59 of the Crimes
Act 1961 (N.Z.), which was in essence identical to s. 43 of the Canadian

84. At this point, it should be recalled that the "age of consent" defined by s. 150.1 of the Criminal
Code applies only to sexual offences, not to the offence of common assault.

28

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Criminal Code, and replaced it with the following defence of "parental
control":85
59 (1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent
of the child is justified in using force if the force used is reasonable in the
circumstances and is for the purpose of(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person;
or
(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage
in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence; or
(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage
in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or
(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good
care and parenting.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the
use of force for the purpose of correction.
(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1).
This statutory defence avoids reference to the concept of deemed or
implied consent; instead, it focuses on the purpose and the degree of force,
requiring that both the parent or other caregiver have a proper purpose for
the use of force and that the force be "reasonable in the circumstances."
Moreover, s. 59(2) clearly eliminates the use of force by way of correction;
even if such force might appear to fall under s. 59(1)(b) or (c), s. 59(3)
subordinates s. 59(1) to s 59(2).
Bill S-209, as passed by the Senate of Canada, would have replaced s.
43 with a provision similar to New Zealand's:
43. (1) Every schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place
of a parent is justified in using reasonable force other than corporal
punishment toward a child who is under their care if the force is used
only for the purpose of
(a) preventing or minimizing harm to the child or another
person;
(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage
in conduct that is of a criminal nature; or
(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage

85.

See Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007, (N.Z.), 2007/18, s. 5.
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in excessively offensive or disruptive behaviour.
(2) In subsection (1), "reasonable force" means an application of force
that is transitory and minimal in the circumstances.
The principal differences are the omission of the purpose of "performing
... normal daily tasks" found in para. I(d) of the New Zealand statute
and the specification of "reasonable" as "transitory and minimal in the
86
circumstances."
New Zealand's s. 59 and the replacement for s. 43 proposed in Bill S209 are improvements over s. 43 as it stands and are probably preferable
to the combination of repealing s. 43 and relying on over the narrow
and uncertain defences of necessity and de minimis. But these statutory
versions of the defence of deemed consent would still provide insufficient
protection to parents and other caregivers. To see this point, consider how
the Senate's version of the defence would play out in the hypothetical cases
outlined in Part 11. 1 above. The defence would apply to hypothetical case
#1 and perhaps to cases #3 and #5 as well, as the purposes in paras. 1(a)
and (c) would be engaged and the force used would be reasonable. But it is
unclear whether the defence would apply to many routine applications of
force by parents and other caregivers. Recall hypothetical case #2, where
a parent restrains a child so that she may receive a vaccination. While the
purpose of this use of force might be covered by para. 1(a) (preventing
or minimizing harm to the child or another person), it is not clear that
the degree of force used would be covered by the proposed subs. (2): the
degree of force might go beyond what a court would consider "transitory
and minimal." Moreover, the list of acceptable purposes in the proposed
subs. 43(1) is drawn quite narrowly. It does not include caring for a child
as such; while some instances of touching for the purposes of care would
fall under the proposed para. 43(1)(a), many would not. Nor does it include
the enforcement of rules of the house or the school unless the child's
misbehaviour reaches the high threshold of being "excessively offensive
or disruptive" (proposed para. 43(1)(c)). Suppose, for example, a sevenyear-old child tries to take one cookie more than he has been permitted.
If his mother physically restrains him, for example by preventing him
from reaching out to the cookie plate, none of the purposes mentioned
in the proposed subs. 43(1) appears to be engaged, so the mother would
have no defence. Similarly, the teacher in hypothetical case #4 would not

86. The work done by s. 59(3) of the New Zealand statute is probably accomplished by the wording
of proposed s. 43(1).
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be protected, as the student's mere possession of a cell phone, though in
breach of school rules, is not in itself disruptive.
A defence of "parentalcare"
This analysis of statutory versions of the defence of "parental control"
suggests that although the motive behind New Zealand's s. 59 and Bill S209 is laudable, the drafting strategy is erroneous. The effort to delineate
the precise and narrow circumstances in which a parent or other caregiver may touch a child without the child's consent for the purpose of
controlling the child is almost certain to fail because there will inevitably
be situations in which a parent is justified in acting but which do not fall
within the statute. The surprising failure of the Senate to include in Bill
S-209 an analogue to New Zealand's para. (1)(d) illustrates the problem. If
Bill S-209 had become law, then in light of its wording and its legislative
history, it would have been strongly arguable that a parent is not permitted
to touch a child for the purpose of "performing normal daily tasks ...
incidental to good care and parenting," such as changing diapers, dressing,
administering comfort, exercising mild restraint to enforce rules, and so
forth. That cannot be the correct result.
Rather than attempting to define the precise circumstances in which
a parent may touch a child, it would be better to provide a legal standard
governing the use of force by a parent, teacher, or other caregiver towards
a child. This legal standard might be called a defence of "parental care," to
indicate that the defence flows from the parent's duty to care for the child
and, when relied upon by teachers and other caregivers, from the extent
to which that duty has been transferred to them. A satisfactory legislative
version of the defence of parental care might state that a parent, teacher,
or person standing in the place of a parent is justified in using force for the
purpose of carrying out their duties in respect of the child, including proper
purposes such as caring for and educating the child, and preventing harm,
crime and disruptive behaviour; provided that the force used is reasonable
in the circumstances, does not amount to degrading or dehumanizing
treatment, and does not intentionally injure the child.
In avoiding the phrase "deemed consent," the definition of the defence
would avoid the fiction that the parent's right to touch the child flows from
the child's actual or implied consent (though where a child was capable of
consenting, actual or deemed consent would of course also be a defence).
By substituting the word "care" for "control," the definition of the defence
would signal that the purposes for which parents may justifiably touch
their children are not limited to controlling children but may include any
purposes that are connected with the parent's duties in relation to a child.
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The limits on the use of force in the proposed defence are typical of the
kind of proportionality requirements associated with other defences to the
offence of assault, such as self-defence87 and s. 43 itself;88 they are designed
to ensure that the force used, even if motivated by a proper purpose related
to the parent's duties, does not undermine that purpose by harming the
child. Finally, because the defence would be a justification rather than an
excuse, it would send a clear signal that when a parent touches a child in
the manner contemplated by the defence, the parent is acting within his
or her rights, rather than committing a wrong which the criminal justice
system will subsequently excuse.
The advantages of a defence of parental care may also be illustrated
by briefly considering possible responses to a constitutional challenge of
the kind posed in CanadianFoundation; While a full analysis of such a
challenge would require an additional paper, the following points may be
helpful. It would be easy to say that since s. 43 survived constitutional.
challenge, afortiori so would the defence of parental care; but the more
interesting point is that even if the arguments against s. 43 had succeeded,
similar challenges to the defence of parental care would likely fail. The
applicants in CanadianFoundationargued that s. 43 was unconstitutionally
vague, that it unconstitutionally infringed the "best interests of the child"
principle, and that it'
infringed children's equality rights. The claim that
the defence of parental care is unconstitutionally vague should fail. By
limiting the uses of force to those that are for the purposes of carrying
out the parent's duties in respect of the child and are not harmful, the
defence would easily meet the standard of creating an intelligible standard
for legal debate and a zone of risk for persons who relied on the defence.89
A law is not vague "simply because reasonable people might disagree as
to its application to particular facts" as long as it "provide[s] a degree of
clarity capable of supporting intelligible debate."' The proposed defence
of parental care easily meets that standard.
The majority in Canadian Foundation held, somewhat surprisingly,
that the "best interests of the child" was not a principle of fundamental

87. Compare the limits on defensive force in Criminal Code, supra note I at ss.34(1) ("no more
[force] than is necessary" for self-defence), 37(l) ("no more force than is necessary to prevent ...
assault"), and s.37(2) ("the wilful infliction of any hurt or mischief that is excessive" is not justified
under s.37(1)). There is considerable controversy as to whether these limits should be understood in
terms of proportionality or in some other way: in respect of s. 34, contrast R. v. Hebert, [1996] 2 S.C.R.
272, with R. v. Walker (2007), 217 C.C.C. (3d) 254 (B.C.C.A.).
88. As interpreted in CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at paras. 26-42.
89. R. v. Nova Scotia PharmaceuticalSociety, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606.
90. Cochrane v. Ontario(Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 718 at para.44.
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justice under s. 7 of the Charter91 ; thus, s. 43 was not required to comply
with that principle. But even if the "best interests of the child" were
recognized as a constitutionalized principle, the defence of parental care
would comply with it. The central purpose of the defence is, precisely, to
promote the best interests of children by ensuring that parents and other
caregivers are not subject to criminal liability when they carry out routine
and necessary tasks related to their duties as parents and caregivers that
require them to touch children (with or without the children's consent);
the limits on the defence are intended to ensure that actions justified by the
defence are not harmful. So the defence of parental care would be entirely
consistent with the best interests of the child.
Finally, the s. 15(1) challenge to the defence of parental care would
be much weaker than was the challenge to s. 43. The defence of parental
care, like s. 43, would draw a distinction based on the enumerated ground
of age. The question of whether this distinction was discriminatory would
be addressed by assessing the four contextual factors outlined in Law:92
(1) whether the distinction affects a group that is vulnerable or suffering
from pre-existing disadvantage; (2) whether the distinction corresponds to
the group's circumstances; (3) whether the distinction has an ameliorative
purpose or effect; and (4) the nature of the interest affected by the
legislation.9 3 The first, third, and fourth factors would seem to tell against
the defence of parental care, for much the same reasons that they counted
against s. 43.94 But the case for holding that the defence of parental
corresponds with children's "needs, capacities, and circumstances"95 is
much stronger than the parallel case for s. 43. The whole point of the
defence of parental care is to make the law of assault correspond with
the needs and circumstances of children, by providing a justification to
parents and other caregivers when they touch children (with or without
consent) for the purpose of fulfilling duties such as protecting and caring
for children.

91. CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at paras. 7-12.
92. Law v. (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999]1 S.C.R. 497.
93. Ibid. at paras. 62-75. After Law, these contextual factors were understood to be relevant in
assessing the ultimate question of whether the distinction undermined the claimant's human dignity:
compare ibid. at paras. 59-61. The court has recently suggested that this focus on human dignity is
misplaced and that the ultimate question is better characterized as whether the legislative distinction
"perpetuat[es] disadvantage and stereotyping": R. . Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para. 24. On either view,
consideration of the four contextual factors from Law remains an important part of the s. 15(1)
analysis.
94. Compare CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at para. 56.
95. Law, supra note 92 at pam. 70; compare CanadianFoundation,supra note 2 at para. 57.
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The existence of a defence of parental care would not exclude other
devices for avoiding unjust convictions. The common law defence of
necessity would, of course, also be available in principle, though I would
anticipate that it would be a rare case where a parent's or caregiver's
necessitous act would not also fall under the defence of parental care.
The de minimis defence might also be available, though it would surely
be a rare case where the force applied by the parent was de minimis but
not justified by the defence of parental care. And the judicious exercise
of prosecutorial discretion would continue to be an important safeguard
against inappropriate charges being laid, but the exercise of that discretion
would be structured by a suitable legal standard that flows from the
recognition that parents and other caregivers are justified in touching
children to discharge their duties in respect of the children.
Conclusion
Countless times every day, parents across Canada touch their children, with
or without the children's consent, for the purposes of caring for, protecting,
and educating their children. The debate around the proposed repeal of s.
43 of the Criminal Code suggested at times that this conduct was, at best,
an assault that might be overlooked through an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion or excused by the common law defence of necessity or the
common law maxim de minimis non curat lex. This view of parental care
is unsatisfactory because it suggests that parents do not have a legal right to
touch their children (though the criminal law regularly excuses them if they
do). Fortunately, the common law also recognizes a defence of "deemed
consent" to parental touching: this defence recognizes that parents are not
merely excused but justified, within limits, in touching their children for
proper purposes related to carrying out their duties to the children. Since
opportunities for further judicial development of the defence are likely to
be rare, and since there is a certain artificiality in the notion of the "deemed
consent" of a child, it might be wise for Parliament to enact a statutory
version of this justification under the rubric of a defence of "parental care"
(possibly in conjunction with a repeal of s. 43 of the CriminalCode). But,
in either the statutory or the common law version, the defence of parental
care recognizes the special nature of the relationship between parents (and
teachers and other caregivers) and children: the parent's justification for
touching the child without the child's consent flows from the parent's duty
to care for, protect,. and raise the child.

